Grants Expenditure and Capital Expenditure Pattern Analysis by Suryana, T. N. (Taufik) & Mulyani, S. (Sri)
Journal of Accounting Auditing and Business -  Vol.2, No.1, 2019                           10.24198/jaab.v2i1.20427 
 
12 http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/jaab – ISSN: 2614-3844 
 
Grants Expenditure and Capital Expenditure Pattern Analysis  
 
 
Taufik Nugraha Suryana 
Faculty of Economics and Business 
Universitas Padjadjaran 
 
Sri Mulyani 
Faculty of Economics and Business 
Universitas Padjadjaran 
 
 
Abstract: The aim of this research to determine the Political Budget Cycle’s (PBC) patterns 
in grants expenditure and capital expenditure before, during, and after the regional election in 
Indonesia in 2012. The method used in this research is a mixed-method, where the first testing 
used simple regression (quantitative approach) then followed by content analysis (qualitative 
approach) for getting more finding from the data. Sample method used in this research is based 
on a purposive sampling method. The results showed that there were Political Budget Cyle’s 
patterns though there was no significant effect of Regional Election on Grants Expenditure and 
Capital Expenditure. The conclusion indicated that there were Political Budget Cycle’s patterns 
in Indonesia on Grants Expenditure and Capital Expenditure. 
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Introduction 
Regional autonomy policy in 
Indonesia has brought many fundamental 
changes to the relation between Local 
Government (executive) and Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) or 
legislative. Before the year 2005, local 
leaders and their deputies were elected by 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 
(DPRD). Since the application of Undang-
Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 about 
Regional Government which was an 
alteration from UU No. 22 Tahun 1999, 
local leaders were elected directly by 
people through Regional Election 
(Pemilihan Kepala Daerah and Wakil 
Kepala Daerah or Pilkada for short). 
The relation between the executive 
and legislative has been through some 
changes, they are no longer as agent 
(executive) and principal (legislative), but 
both act as agents of the voter's community. 
Using sample from the United States of 
America, (Benito, et al. 2012:342) showed 
that “the size of the electoral cycle, 
especially Political Budget Cycle (PBC) 
did not depend on whether the governor 
was lame ducks or not.” “Lame ducks 
opportunistic behavior can also be 
explained by their desire to help their 
colleagues to enhance the chance to get a 
better job outside politics,” (Rosenberg, 
1992:2). 
Based on Peraturan Pemerintah 
Republik Indonesia Nomor 58 Tahun 2005 
about Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah, that 
state-local leader as the regional 
government leaders have the authorities of 
the regional financial management and 
represent local government concerning the 
ownership of the separated regional wealth. 
With the power that they have, incumbent 
as well as lame ducks, they have a 
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considerable chance to misuse the 
expenditure in APBD for their benefits. 
This budget abuse is known as Political 
Budget Cycle (PBC), which concentrates 
more on the utilization of fiscal policy. 
PBC (Political Business Cycle) is 
an effort to manipulate the economy by 
using fiscal and monetary policy (Sakurai 
and Filho, 2010:3). PBC (Political Business 
Cycle), “ with a myopic voter, then-
incumbent or lame ducks government can 
use macroeconomic policy for their benefit 
so that the voters will respond by 
supporting those incumbent or lame 
ducks,” Nordhaus (1975:20). Ehrhart 
(2010:4), “manipulation for the benefit of 
the election will cause damage to economic 
condition, and there is the fact that 
economic condition recovery can last 
several years.” It is crucial to understand 
what type of expenditures can be 
manipulated. 
Political Budget Cycle (PBC) is a 
common phenomenon all around the world, 
according to Shia and Svensson (2006:2). 
However, most Political Budget Cycle 
(PBC) testing in those countries was more 
concentrated on the general election that 
determines central government, especially 
presidential election. Benito, et al. 
(2012:342). Local governments, as well as 
provincial government, are part of the 
government that is closest to the 
community, whose policy can be observed 
carefully by the community. As 
consequences, incumbent or lame ducks in 
local governments and also provincial 
government increase greater fiscal policy 
and budget manipulation to influence 
potential in local government as well as in 
provincial government than in the central 
government. 
Political Budget Cycle (PBC) 
testing can be done by testing expenditure 
policy fluctuation taken by incumbents and 
also lame ducks as explained by Veiga and 
Veiga (2007:3) that “there was evidence of 
expenditure composition manipulation, 
which incurred far greater in election year 
on expense classification that is highly 
visible  by the voters while other 
expenditures that are less visible by the 
voters will stay the same or decrease”. This 
explanation was confirmed by Drazen and 
Eslava (2005:4). The phenomenon in the 
region which its expenditures were highly 
visible by the voters was West Java villages 
fund program organized by West Java 
province in the year 2013 where every 
village receive fund amounted Rp. 
100.000.000,00 through grants expenditure 
scheme. 
The increasing highly visible 
expenditure phenomenon was confirmed by 
the early study. This phenomenon can be 
seen in attachment 1. There were grants 
expenditure fluctuations in the year 2011-
2013 with the conducting of the regional 
election in 2012. There were increases in 
expenditure in 20 out of a total of 30 regions 
a year before the regional election 
compared to year during the conducting of 
the regional election. Moreover, there were 
decreases in grants expenditure in 22 out of 
30 regions a year after regional election 
compared to the year during the regional 
election was being held. 
Aside from highly visible 
expenditures increasing phenomenon, there 
was a decreasing phenomenon from the less 
visible expenditures. This phenomenon can 
be seen in attachment 2. There were capital 
expenditure fluctuations in the year 2011-
2013 when the regional election was held in 
2012. 17 out of a total 30 regions 
experience a decrease in capital 
expenditure a year before the regional 
election compared to the year when the 
regional election was being held. 
Moreover, 17 out of 30 regions experienced 
capital expenditure increase a year after 
regional election compared to the year 
during the regional election was being held.  
Based on that background, the 
identification of the problem in this 
research is: were there Political Budget 
Cycle (PBC) patterns in grants 
expenditures in Indonesia in the year 2012? 
Moreover, were there Political Budget 
Cycle (PBC) patterns in capital expenditure 
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in Indonesia in the year 2012? In 
accordance with the background and 
identification of problems, then this 
research was done with the intention to find 
out if there were Political Budget Cycle 
(PBC) patterns in grants expenditure in 
Indonesia in the year 2012 and to find out 
whether there were Political Budget Cycle 
(PBC) patterns in capital expenditure in 
Indonesia in the year 2012. 
 
Literature Review 
Business Cycle is a fluctuation in 
the economy. (Mankiw, 2008:15). PBC 
(Political Business Cycle) is an effort to 
manipulate the economy using policy and 
monetary policy (Sakurai and Filho, 
2010:3). This theory assumes that the 
business cycle phenomenon can be 
connected with political activities, such as 
election to vote for president or in other 
word cycle is also connected with the 
election cycle. 
Meanwhile, Nordhaus (1975:188) 
gave a conclusion about what is PBC 
(Political Business Cycle), “with a myopic 
condition that the voters had, the incumbent 
or lame ducks government can use 
macroeconomy for their own benefit so that 
the voters will respond by supporting those 
incumbent or lame ducks”. So, it can be 
concluded that Political Business Cycle 
(PBC) is “efforts done by incumbent 
government to get reelected in the next 
election by manipulating economic policy 
for short term benefit or lame ducks that 
will give signal to enhance the opportunity 
to get a better job outside politics or their 
desire to help their colleagues”, 
(Rosenberg, 1992:2). In Ehrhart (2010:4), 
“manipulation for the election benefit will 
cause damage to the economic condition, 
there is a fact that economy condition 
recovery can last several years.” It is crucial 
to understand the types of expenditure that 
can be manipulated. 
Theoretically, the opportunistic model 
and partisan had developed in two phases. 
In phase one, the model was based on the 
assumption that voters have adaptive 
expectations which are assuming that 
voters will do mostly the same things in the 
future even though they were 
systematically “tricked.”  In the second 
phase, the model was developed based on 
the assumption that voters are rational and 
they cannot systematically be “tricked” 
based on available observation of the 
available information. In this case, political 
cycles arise based on the asymmetry 
between the voters and incumbents or lame 
ducks (Benito et al., 2012:344) 
From the first writing about PBC, we 
can arrange a diagram about the 
development of PBC theory until today as 
follow: 
 
 
Figure 1. PBC (Political Business Cycle) Theory Development Chart 
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PBC with Opportunistic 
(Oportunis) model started with Nordhaus 
scientific work (1975:187) that concluded 
incumbent government will put their best 
effort to get reelected by making conducive 
macroeconomic condition approaching the 
election, does not matter with which 
political party the incumbent government 
were affiliated. Opportunistic PBC has an 
assumption that voters will give a reward 
for the incumbent government if the 
incumbent government (as well as the party 
that became incumbent government 
affiliation) able to provide the best 
macroeconomic condition during the 
upcoming election.  
Government policy that was not 
neutral during upcoming election caused 
PBC opportunist to occur by using 
monetary or fiscal policy. From these 
useable tow policies, emerge a derivative of 
Opportunist PBC theory, which is Political 
Monetary Cycles (PMC) and Political 
Budget Cycles (PBC).  
According to Krause and Mendez 
(2004:752), Other PBC models are 
“Partisan models developed by Hibbs 
(1977) and Alesina (1987) who basically 
mentioned that PBC can also happen 
because of ideological difference between 
alternating parties holding the power, one 
party (for example the left wing) concerned 
more about unemployment rate and support 
expansionary policy to reduce the output 
gap with the risk of certain inflation rate, 
and the other party was more sensitive to 
inflation rate and did not put much attention 
to unemployment”.  
Partisan model, developed by Hibbs 
(1977:1467), “was also focused to Phillips 
curve (like in Opportunist theory) and view 
that political party has a different position 
along that Phillips Curve, depend to the 
policy of each political party”. But in 
reality, Partisan Model became opposition 
of Opportunist Model because Partisan 
Model emphasize on politician behavior to 
maximize their own objective function, 
different with Opportunist theory who only 
conclude that opportunist politician only 
wants to get re-elected and to have their 
original post. Along with the introduction 
of Rational Expectation concept, the 
revision of Hibbs’ Partisan Model was done 
by Alesina in 1987 and 1988, Alesina and 
Rubini in the year 1992 and many other 
researchers. 
One of the derivatives of Political 
Business Cycle (PBC) is Political Monetary 
Cycle (PMC). Political Monetary Cycle 
(PMC) can be defined as taking advantage 
of a short-run trade-off from the Phillips 
curve near regional election to gain benefit 
(Nordhaus, 1975:187). This trade-off 
happens to inflation and unemployment, 
where inflation inversely proportional to 
unemployment.  Assumption underlying 
PMC is “non-independent central bank so 
that, incumbents, as well as lame ducks, use 
their power in money supply policy,” 
Benito et al., (2012:342). “Incumbents, as 
well as lame ducks, increase the amount of 
money supply so that unemployment rate 
can be reduced near regional election 
making the voters reelect the incumbents or 
supporting their colleagues or increasing 
the chance to get a better job outside of 
politics” (Rosenberg, 1992:2). 
Other derivatives of Political Business 
Cycle (PBC) is the Political Budget Cycle 
(PBC). Political Budget Cycle (PBC) can 
be defined as  “periodic fluctuation in fiscal 
policy influenced by election 
cycle”,(Benito, et al. 2012:342). Political 
Budget Cycle (PBC) is a common 
phenomenon across the world according to 
Shia and Svensson (2006:2), Political 
Budget Cycle (PBC) is a “universal 
phenomenon both in developed countries as 
well as in developing countries regardless 
of the form of the government in each 
country, such as, monarchy, republic, etc”. 
However most Political Budget 
Cycle (PBC) testing in those countries were 
concentrated to election that determines 
central government, especially presidential 
election. As expressed by Benito, et al. 
(2012:342) that “most Political Budget 
Cycle (PBC) literature focused into central 
government, only a few works of literature 
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put their attention Political Budget Cycle 
(PBC) in provinces or Regency/cities”. 
Local governments, as well as provincial 
government, are part of government that 
closest to the community, whose policies 
can easily be monitored by the community 
as consequences, incumbent or lame ducks 
in local government or provincial 
government increase greater fiscal policy or 
budget manipulation to influence voters in 
local government or provincial government 
rather than central government. 
Based on those theories, the hypothesis 
of this research are: 
 
H1: There is PBC (Political Budget Cycle) 
pattern in grants expenditure before, 
during, and after a regional election.  
H2: There is no PBC (Political Budget 
Cycle) pattern in capital expenditure 
before, during and after a regional 
election. 
 
Research Method 
 
The method used in this research is 
a mixed-method, where the researchers first 
did testing using descriptive and 
verification quantitative approach, then 
followed by a descriptive qualitative 
approach. The population in this research 
are the local governments in Indonesia 
conducting the regional election in the year 
2012. The total population for this research 
is 82 Local Governments (Pemerintah 
Daerah (Pemda), while the research 
samples are 30 Local Governments. 
The sampling method used in this 
research is based on a purposive sampling 
method. The referred criteria are the 
availability of local government financial 
statements period 2011 till 2013 and the 
availability of all data needed during 
research method and availability of grants 
expenditure data submitted to Komisi 
Pemilihan Umum (KPU) in the year 2012. 
Using the selection criteria mentioned 
above, 30 Province/Regencies/Cities were 
chosen, consisting of 3 Province, 6 
Regencies and 21 Cities. This research took 
3 years time. 
Governor, Regent, and Mayor 
Elections are the election of governors,  
regents, and mayors democratically in 
Negara  Kesatuan  Republik  Indonesia 
based on Pancasila and Undang-Undang  
Dasar  Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 
1945. (UU no. 15 Tahun 2011 
Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Umum). This 
regional election was measured by 
reviewing regional election execution 
report posted in the official KPU website. 
Capital expenditure is budget expenditure 
for fixed assets and other assets acquisition 
that give benefit for more than one 
accounting period (Halim and Kusufi, 
2012:107). Capital expenditure is measured 
by looking at capital expenditure value 
presented in Local Government Financial 
Statements. Grants expenditure is 
“expenditure used to budget grant in the 
form of money, goods, and service to 
government or other local government, and 
a group of community/individual whose 
allotment has been assigned specifically ” 
(Permendagri  No. 39 Tahun 2012). Grants 
expenditure is measured by looking at 
grants expenditure value presented in Local 
Government Financial Statements. 
In this research, the researcher used 
data gathering techniques commonly used 
in research, which are field research and 
literature research. Data analysis methods 
used in this research consist of two 
approaches, which are a quantitative and 
qualitative approach. In a quantitative 
approach, the researcher used the event 
study analysis taking advantage of a 
regional election in the year 2012. This 
event was treated as an event that can give 
a chance for the incumbent as well as lame 
ducks to perform opportunistic behavior 
concerning fiscal policy or budget 
manipulation which Political Budget Cycle 
(PBC) hoping to be able to influence the 
voters. 
While in a qualitative approach, 
grants expenditure and capital expenditure 
fluctuations analysis were done using 
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content analysis  Content analysis is a  
“research technique used to determine the 
occurrence of words or concepts in writing 
or corpus” (Busch, et al. 2012:1). 
Generally, according to  Busch et al. 
(2012:3), there were two types of content 
analysis which were conceptual analysis 
and relational analysis “But,  traditionally,  
conceptual analysis is a  content analysis 
most often used.  Conceptual analysis can 
be used to determine the existence and 
frequency of the concept displayed in most 
occurrence word in a text,  so we can 
determine how many times the word 
occurs” (Firdaus, et al. 2010:11). “While, 
content analysis can be used to observe 
trend” (Busch, et al. 2012:3).  
  
The simple linear regression model with a 
dummy variable  
 
The simple linear regression model with a 
dummy variable used defined as followed: 
1) BH𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎+𝜷𝑫2012+𝜺𝒕 
2) BM𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎+𝜷𝑫2012+𝜺𝒕 
 
where, 
BH𝒕 = Grants expenditure in a certain 
year 
BM𝒕 = Capital expenditure in an certain 
year 
𝜶𝟎 = excluded variable 
𝜷 = coefficient variable 
𝑫2012 = dummy variable regional election 
(t worth 1 if it falls on the regional election 
and 0 in other year and so forth) 
𝜺𝒕 = residual error. 
 
Result and Discussion 
 
According to descriptive statistical 
testing result, the grants expenditure was 
forming Political Budget Cycle (PBC) 
patterns, which can be seen from the mean 
value fluctuation and maximum value in 
2011-2013. The mean value in 2011-2013. 
Grants expenditure mean value in the year 
2012 is bigger than grants expenditure 
mean value in 2011 and 2013 and grants 
expenditure maximum value in 2012 was 
bigger than grants expenditure maximum 
value in 2011 and 2013. This means that, 
descriptive statistic result confirmed the 
researcher’s hypothesis that there was an 
increase in grants expenditure during 
regional election where the increase was the 
result of opportunistic behavior misusing 
the available fiscal capacity for their own 
benefit or their colleagues or in other words 
they were doing PBC (Political Budget 
Cycle) by moving budget allocation used to 
support them or their colleagues.  
Meanwhile, for capital expenditure, 
forming Political Budget Cycle (PBC) 
patterns can be seen from the mean value 
fluctuations, minimum and maximum value 
in 2011-2013. Capital expenditure means 
value in 2012 is smaller than capital 
expenditure means value in the year 2011 
and 2013. These findings were confirmed 
by minimum and maximum value 
fluctuation in 2011-2013. This means that, 
descriptive statistical result confirmed the 
researcher’s hypothesis that there was a 
decrease in capital expenditure during the 
regional election where the decrease was 
the result of opportunistic behavior 
misusing the available fiscal capacity for 
their own benefit or their colleagues or in 
other words they were doing PBC (Political 
Budget Cycle) by moving budget allocation 
used to support them or their colleagues. 
The allocation move from less visible 
expenditures to highly visible expenditures. 
Analysis tool used to estimate the 
equation in this research is simple 
regression analysis.  Before doing a 
regression test, the gathered data is first 
analyzed using classical assumption test.  
Classical assumption test used in this 
research is normality and 
heteroskedasticity. In this research, all 
classical assumption test have been done 
and the result showed that equation model 
with grants expenditure as the dependent 
variable is not distributed normally, then 
root transformation was done and the result 
of this root transformation was free from 
heteroskedasticity and normal data 
distribution. While the equation model with 
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capital expenditure as a dependent variable 
was free from heteroskedasticity and 
normal data distribution. 
Regression analysis result for 
hypothesis 1 testing resulted a simple linear 
regression equation as follow:  Y1 = 0,166 
+ 0,013 D1 + e. The explanation are as 
follow: α = 0,166 is a constant meaning 
Grants expenditure will be 
(0,166)2=0,027556 when Regional election 
is not held, which equals 0. β1 = 0,013 ia a 
regression coefficient for Regional election 
variable of (0,013)2=0,000169, meaning 
that regional election is held, equals 1, then 
Grants expenditure will increase 0,0169% 
assuming other variable are constant. 
According to the result of 
statistically data processing above, there 
were a Political Budget Cycle (PBC) 
patterns on grants expenditure. This show 
that there were grants expenditure patterns 
based on Sakurai and Filho (2010) and 
Ritonga and Alam (2010) that during 
regional election, local government tend to 
show opportunistic behavior by misusing 
available fiscal capacity for their own 
benefits or their colleagues benefit, or in 
other word, performing PBC (Political 
Budget Cycle) by moving budget allocation 
used to support them or their colleagues 
grants expenditure (highly visible). Even 
so, the conducting of a regional election in 
this research has less real influence (R) to 
grants expenditure and insignificant to 
grants expenditure.  
The small influence was caused by 
the cautious attitude of the local leaders, 
both incumbent and lame ducks. This 
cautious behavior can be seen by BPK 
findings in grants expenditure if comparing 
between years 2007 to 2012. There were 
BPK findings in grants expenditure in 
LKPD Kab. Lampung Barat, Kota Cimahi, 
and Kabupaten Halmahera Tengah year 
2007 but those findings were not found in 
the year 2012. Besides that, allocations 
were distributed to other costs such as the 
local leaders' inauguration through goods 
and service expenditure scheme. 
The difference in sample research 
might influence that the result of this 
research was not significant, because out of 
82 local government which was the 
population, researcher only took 30 to be 
the research sample, meaning 36,58% out 
of all local government conducting regional 
election in year 2012 due to data limitation 
concerning local government grant 
limitation to KPU regarding regional 
election.  
From the available data, it can be 
seen that in five local governments, there is 
an increase consistently from the year 
2011-2013, which mean that grants 
expenditure increase was considered proper 
considering APBD tendency to keep 
increasing from year to year and the 
increasing need for grants expenditure, 
causing the consistent increase. The same 
with other ten local governments, even 
though there was a decline from the year 
2011-2012, from 2012-2013 the deficit 
value became smaller in four local 
governments, and even there were positive 
values in other six local governments. 
The result of the regression analysis 
for hypothesis 2 testing, a simple linear 
regression equation as follow was obtained: 
Y2 = 0,208 - 0,016 D1 + e. The explanation 
is as follow: α = 0,208 is constant meaning 
capital expenditure will be  0,208% when 
the regional election is not conducted, 
which has a value of 0. β1 = -0,016 is a 
regression coefficient for regional election 
variable of -0,016, meaning regional 
election was conducted, which has a value 
of 1, then capital expenditure while decline  
0,016% assuming other variables are 
constant. 
The result of statistical data 
processing was that there were Political 
Budget Cycle (PBC) patterns in capital 
expenditure. This shows that there were 
capital expenditure patterns according to 
Sakurai and Filho (2010) that during 
Regional election, Local government tend 
to show opportunistic behavior misusing 
fiscal capacity for their benefit or their 
colleagues, or in other word, doing 
Journal of Accounting Auditing and Business -  Vol.2, No.1, 2019                           10.24198/jaab.v2i1.20427 
 
19 http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/jaab – ISSN: 2614-3844 
PBC(Political Budget Cycle) by moving 
budget allocation used to support them or 
their colleagues in capital expenditure (less 
visible). Even so, the conducting of a 
regional election in this research have little 
real influence (R) towards capital 
expenditure and not significant to capital 
expenditure.  
The small influence was caused by 
the cautious attitude of the local leaders, 
both incumbent as well as lame ducks. This 
cautiousness can be seen in BPK findings 
in capital expenditure while comparing the 
year 2008 with 2013, where BPK findings 
in capital expenditure in LKPD Kab. 
Ciamis year 2008 but the findings were not 
found in the year 2013. Besides that, the 
allocations were distributed to other costs 
such as the cost of local leaders’ 
inauguration through goods and service 
expenditure scheme. 
The researcher also did qualitative 
data analysis to explain further the result of 
quantitative data analysis. Qualitative data 
analysis was done through content analysis 
during the early grants expenditure and 
capital expenditure study by the researcher. 
The conformity of PBC (Political Budget 
Cycle) pattern with the researcher’s early 
study was shown in attached figure 1 
From the data that the researcher 
gather, it can be concluded that as many as 
4 Local governments out of 30 Local 
governments or 49,63% have PBC 
(Political Budget Cycle) patterns in grants 
expenditure allocation even though it is not 
the majority of the pattern. The result of the 
qualitative approach supports the result of 
quantitative approach done before that, 
where quantitative result showed that there 
were a PBC (Political Budget Cycle) 
patterns in grants expenditure allocation, 
but it was not significant.  
Meanwhile, out of 14 local 
governments where Political Budget Cycle 
(PBC) patterns existed in grants 
expenditure, 10 of local governments were 
incumbents. It means that majority 71% of 
local governments who had Political 
Budget Cycle (PBC) patterns were local 
governments with incumbents status. 
Meanwhile, 30% from total local 
governments were incumbents local 
government which had Political Budget 
Cycle (PBC) patterns in grants expenditure. 
It means that there were higher Political 
Budget Cycle (PBC) patterns in grants 
expenditure local government with 
incumbents status. The result of the 
qualitative analysis was confirmed by the 
result of a quantitative calculation, where 
correlation coefficient and coefficient of 
determination in local government 
incumbents were higher than the local 
government with incumbents and lame 
ducks combination. 
Meanwhile for capital expenditure 
patterns, from the data that the researcher 
gather, it can be concluded that 11 Local 
governments or 36,67% had PBC (Political 
Budget Cycle) patterns in capital 
expenditure allocation although they were 
not the majority. The qualitative approach 
supports the quantitative approach done 
before that, where the result of the 
quantitative approach that there were PBC 
(Political Budget Cycle) patterns in capital 
expenditure allocation but they were not 
significant. 
Out of 11 local governments who 
had Political Budget Cycle (PBC) patterns 
in capital expenditure, seven local 
governments were incumbents. Meaning, 
majority 63% of local governments that had 
Political Budget Cycle (PBC) patterns were 
the local government with incumbents 
status. Meanwhile, 23% of the total local 
government was local government 
incumbents that had Political Budget Cycle 
(PBC) patterns in capital expenditure. It 
means that there were higher Political 
Budget Cycle (PBC) patterns in capital 
expenditure in government with 
incumbents status. The result of this 
qualitative analysis was confirmed by the 
result of a quantitative calculation, where 
correlation coefficient and coefficient of 
the determinant in incumbents local 
government are higher than correlation 
coefficients and coefficient of 
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determination local government with 
incumbents and lame ducks combination. 
 
 
Conclusion and Suggestion 
 
In this research, researcher test how 
Grants expenditure and Capital expenditure 
patterns analysis before, during, and after 
Regional election in Regional Government 
in Indonesia Budget Year 2012. The first 
hypothesis testing showed that there were 
Political Budget Cycle (PBC) patterns in 
grants expenditure. The result of this 
research was in accordance with Sakurai 
and Filho (2010) and Ritonga and Alam 
(2010) that during Regional election, Local 
government tend to show opportunistic 
behavior misusing fiscal capacity for their 
own benefit or their colleagues, or in other 
word doing PBC (Political Budget Cycle) 
by moving budget allocation used to 
support them or their colleagues in grants 
expenditure (highly visible). Even so, the 
conduction of the Regional election in this 
research only has a small influence on 
grants expenditure and the influence was 
not significant. 
The result of the qualitative 
approach supports the result of quantitative 
approach done before that, where the 
quantitative result showed that there were 
PBC (Political Budget Cycle) patterns in 
grants expenditure allocation, but it was not 
significant. There were PBC (Political 
Budget Cycle) in 14 Local governments out 
of 30  Local governments researched or 
49,63% meaning that there were PBC 
(Political Budget Cycle) patterns in grants 
expenditure allocation even though they 
were not the majority. Moreover, there 
were higher Political Budget Cycle (PBC) 
patterns in grants expenditure in local 
government with incumbents status. 
The result of the second hypothesis 
testing showed that there were Political 
Budget Cycle (PBC) patterns in capital 
expenditures. This result was in accordance 
with Sakurai and Filho (2010) that during 
Regional election, Local government tend 
to show opportunistic behavior by misusing 
available fiscal capacity for their own 
benefit or their colleagues’, or in other 
words they were doing PBC(Political 
Budget Cycle) by moving budget allocation 
used to support them or their colleagues 
from less visible capital expenditure. Even 
so, the Regional election in this research 
has little real influence on capital 
expenditure, and it was insignificant. 
The small influence in both 
hypothesis testing was caused by the 
cautious behavior of the local leaders, both 
incumbent as well as lame ducks. This 
cautiousness can be seen in decreasing BPK 
findings in Capital expenditure between the 
year 2008-2013. Besides that, Capital 
expenditure allocation was distributed to 
other costs such as local leaders 
inauguration cost through goods and 
service expenditure scheme. Sample 
research difference might influence the 
insignificance of this research’s result 
because out of 82 local governments that 
became population, and the researcher only 
took 30 to research sample because of the 
limitation of local government grants data 
submitted to KPU for the benefit of the 
regional election. 
The result of the qualitative 
approach analysis showed that there were 
PBC (Political Budget Cycle) in capital 
expenditure allocation, but they were not 
significant. The same thing is shown in the 
table above, where there were PBC 
(Political Budget Cycle) in 11 local 
government or 36,67%, meaning that there 
were PBC (Political Budget Cycle) in 
capital expenditure allocation although they 
were not the majority. Also, there were 
higher Political Budget Cycle (PBC) 
patterns in capital expenditure in local 
governments with incumbents status. 
For the Local Government, to 
review the effectiveness of local regulation 
concerning grants expenditure and capital 
expenditure so that the damage to the 
economic condition due to Political Budget 
Cycle (PBC) can be minimized and can be 
allocated to other items that can have a 
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multiplier effect towards the economic 
condition of each region. Even though the 
research showed that Political Budget 
Cycle (PBC) had little influence and 
insignificantly or has minority result in a 
qualitative approach, there still Political 
Budget Cycle (PBC) pattern in Local 
Government Financial Statement (Laporan 
Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah (LKPD)).  
For Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK) in 
every province to do more in-depth 
supervision for the two kinds of 
expenditure. For the next researcher, to 
enlarge the sample studied so that problems 
concerning correlation coefficient, 
determination coefficient, and 
insignificance of hypothesis testing can be 
resolved. Subsequent researches using 
other variables such as, goods and services 
expenditure, which can substantiate this 
research are also expected. 
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